A question would naturally arise in the
minds of curious observers of regional geopolitics that why did Pakistan choose
to wage Washington’s proxy war against the erstwhile Soviet Union in
Afghanistan during the 1980s?
Was it to strengthen its defenses against
India, the oft-quoted “strategic depth” military doctrine, or the fear that the
former Soviet Union might make further advances into Pakistan’s western
Balochistan province to reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea?
All these geopolitical considerations
might have played a part, but in order to understand the real reason why
Pakistan decided to become Washington’s accomplice in the Afghan conflict, we
need to understand the nature of power.
Rationally speaking, power ought to be
means to achieve higher goals, but “normative idealism” is generally shunned in
realpolitik, and rather than as means to an end, power is cherished as an end
in itself, and it is the nature of power to expand further and to grow more
powerful.
Thus, Pakistan’s military establishment
did not collaborate in Washington’s “bear trap” project for any ulterior strategic
goal; the objective was simply to exercise power by taking advantage of the
opportunity.
In order to elaborate this abstract
concept, I would like to draw a parallel between power and sex. In the grand
scheme of things, sex is not an end in itself; it is means to an end, the end
being the procreation of offspring.
But many hedonic couples nowadays use
contraceptives and don’t consider it worthwhile to procreate and nurture
children, due to economic constraints or the unnecessary effort that nurturing
children inevitably entails.
Social scientists have no business
offering advice or moral lessons; to each his own. But if the ultimate end for
which nature has invented the agency comes to a naught, that does not per se
renders the agency any less significant, instead the agency itself becomes a
categorical imperative.
Thus, power is like sex; its exercise is
pleasurable and its goal is further expansion and amassing more power to
gratify insatiable needs of compulsive power-maniacs.
Regarding the much-touted argument that
Pakistan’s military trained and armed Afghan jihadists during the Soviet-Afghan
War in the 1980s as self-defense to prevent the likelihood of Soviet Union
invading Pakistan’s western Balochistan province in order to reach the warm
waters of the Arabian Sea, according to recently declassified documents [1] of the
White House, CIA and State Department, as reported by Tim Weiner for The
Washington Post, the CIA was aiding Afghan jihadists before the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
The then American President Jimmy Carter
signed the CIA directive to arm the Afghan jihadists in July 1979, whereas the
former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December the same year. That the CIA
was arming the Afghan jihadists six months before the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan has been proven by the State Department’s declassified documents; fact
of the matter, however, is that the nexus between the CIA, Pakistan’s security
agencies and the Gulf states to train and arm the Afghan jihadists against the
former Soviet Union was formed several years before the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
Historically, Pakistan’s military first
used the Islamists of Jamaat-e-Islami during the Bangladesh war of liberation
in the late 1960s against the Bangladeshi nationalist Mukti Bahini liberation
movement of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman – the father of current prime minister of
Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, and the founder of Bangladesh, which was then
a province of Pakistan and known as East Pakistan before the independence of
Bangladesh in 1971.
Jamaat-e-Islami is a far-right Islamist
movement in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh – analogous to the Muslim
Brotherhood political party in Egypt and Turkey – several of whose leaders have
recently been hanged by the Bangladeshi nationalist government of Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed for committing massacres of Bangladeshi civilians
on behalf of Pakistan’s military during the late 1960s.
Then, during the 1970s, Pakistan’s
then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began aiding the Afghan Islamists
against Sardar Daud’s government, who had toppled his first cousin King Zahir
Shah in a palace coup in 1973 and had proclaimed himself the president of
Afghanistan.
Sardar Daud was a Pashtun nationalist and
laid claim to Pakistan’s northwestern Pashtun-majority province. Pakistan’s
security establishment was wary of his irredentist claims and used Islamists to
weaken his rule in Afghanistan. He was eventually assassinated in 1978 as a
result of the Saur Revolution led by the Afghan communists.
Pakistan’s support to the Islamists with
the Saudi petro-dollars and Washington’s blessings, however, kindled the fires
of Islamic insurgencies in the entire region comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Indian-administered Kashmir and the Soviet Central Asian States.
The former Soviet Union was wary that its
forty-million Muslims were susceptible to radicalism, because Islamic
radicalism was infiltrating across the border into the Central Asian States
from Afghanistan. Therefore, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December
1979 in support of the Afghan communists to forestall the likelihood of Islamic
insurgencies spreading to the Central Asian States bordering Afghanistan.
Regarding the Kashmir dispute, there can be no two views
that the right of self-determination of Kashmiris must be respected in
accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions on the right of plebiscite
for the Kashmiri people, and Pakistan should lend its moral, political and
diplomatic support to the Kashmiri cause; but at the same time, the
militarization of any dispute, including Kashmir, must be avoided due to
massive human suffering that militancy and wars anywhere in the world
inevitably entail.
The insurgency in Kashmir erupted in the fateful year of
1984 of the Orwellian-fame when the Indian Armed Forces surreptitiously
occupied the whole of Siachen glacier, including the un-demarcated Pakistani
portion.
Now, we must keep the backdrop in mind: those were the
heydays of the Cold War and Pakistan Army’s proxies, the Afghan jihadists, were
winning battle after battle against the Soviet Red Army, and the morale of Pakistan
Army's top brass was touching the sky.
Moreover, Pakistan’s security establishment also wanted to
inflict damage to the Indian Armed Forces to exact revenge for the
dismemberment of Pakistan at the hands of India during the Bangladesh War of
1971, when India provided support to Bangladeshi nationalists and took 90,000
Pakistani soldiers as prisoners of war after Pakistan’s humiliating defeat in
the war of liberation of Bangladesh.
All the military’s top brass had to do was to divert a fraction
of its Afghan jihadist proxies toward the Indian-administered Kashmir to kindle
the fires of insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan’s security agencies began sending
jihadists experienced in the Afghan guerilla warfare across the border to the
Indian-administered Kashmir in the late 1980s; and by the early 1990s, the
Islamist insurgency engulfed the whole of Jammu and Kashmir region.
Here, it’s worth noting, however, that an insurgency cannot
succeed anywhere unless militants get some level of popular support from local
population. For example: if a hostile force tries to foment an insurgency in
Pakistan’s province of Punjab, it wouldn’t succeed; because Punjabis don’t have
any grievances against Pakistan.
On the other hand, if an adversary tries to incite an
insurgency in the marginalized province of Balochistan and Pakistan’s tribal
areas, it will easily succeed, because the local Baloch and Pashtun populations
have grievances against the heavy-handedness of Pakistan’s security
establishment.
Therefore, to put the blame squarely on the Pakistani side
for the Kashmir conflict would be unfair. Firstly, immediately after the
independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, India annexed the Muslim-majority
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in violation of the agreed-upon “partition
principle” that allocated the Muslim-majority provinces of the British India to
Pakistan and the Hindu-majority regions to India.
Even now, if someone tries to foment an insurgency in the
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, it wouldn’t succeed, because the Kashmiri
Muslims identify themselves with Pakistan. The Indian-administered Kashmir has
seen many waves for independence since 1947, but not a single voice has been
raised for independence in the Pakistan-administered Kashmir in Pakistan’s
seventy-year history.
Secondly, India re-ignited the conflict by occupying the
strategically placed Siachen glacier in 1984. Pakistan's stance on Kashmir has
been quite flexible and it has floated numerous proposals to resolve the
dispute. But India is now the new strategic partner of Washington against
China, hence India’s stance on the Kashmir dispute has been quite inflexible,
as it is negotiating from a position of strength. Diplomacy aside, however, the
real victims of this intransigence and hubris on both sides have been the
Kashmiri people and a lot of innocent blood has been spilled for no good
reason.
Finally, another obstacle to the peaceful resolution of the
Kashmir dispute is that the Kashmiri liberation struggle and militancy have
been indigenized to a great extent during the last two decades. An entire
generation of Kashmiri youth has been brought up in an environment of fear and
bloodletting. Now, no political solution to the Kashmir conflict is possible
unless it is acceptable to domestic political leadership of the Kashmiri
people.