The Sunni-Shi’a conflict in the Middle East region is
essentially a political conflict between the Gulf Arab autocrats and Iran for
regional dominance which is being presented to lay Muslims in the veneer of
religiosity.
Saudi Arabia, which has been vying for power as the leader
of Sunni bloc against the Shi’a-led Iran in the regional geopolitics, was
staunchly against the invasion of Iraq by the Bush Administration in 2003.
The Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein constituted a Sunni
Arab bulwark against Iran’s meddling in the Arab world. But after Saddam was
ousted from power in 2003 and subsequently when elections were held in Iraq
which were swept by Shi’a-dominated parties, Iraq has now been led by a
Shi’a-majority government that has become a steadfast regional ally of Iran.
Consequently, Iran’s sphere of influence now extends all the way from
territorially-contiguous Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and the Mediterranean coast.
Moreover, during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush
Administration took advantage of the ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq and
used the Kurds and Shi’as against the Sunni-led Baathist regime of Saddam
Hussein. And during the occupation years from 2003 to 2011, the once dominant
Sunni minority was politically marginalized which further exacerbated the
ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq.
The Saudi royal family was resentful of Iran’s encroachment
on the traditional Arab heartland. Therefore, when protests broke out against
the Shi’a-led Syrian government in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings of
2011, the Gulf states along with their regional Sunni allies, Turkey and
Jordan, and the Western patrons gradually militarized the protests to dismantle
the Iranian resistance axis.
Reportedly, Syria's pro-Assad militias are comprised of
local militiamen as well as Shi’a foreign fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and
even the Hazara Shi’as from as far away as Afghanistan and Pakistan. And
similarly, Sunni jihadists from all over the region have also been flocking to
the Syrian battlefield for the last seven years.
A full-scale Sunni-Shi’a war has been going on in Syria,
Iraq and Yemen which will obviously have its repercussions all over the Islamic
world where Sunni and Shi’a Muslims have coexisted in relative peace for centuries.
Notwithstanding, in order to create a semblance of
objectivity and fairness, the American policymakers and analysts are always
willing to accept the blame for the mistakes of the distant past that have no
bearing on their present policy, however, any fact that impinges on their
present policy is conveniently brushed aside.
In the case of the creation of the Islamic State, for
instance, the US policy analysts are willing to concede that invading Iraq back
in 2003 was a mistake that radicalized the Iraqi society, exacerbated sectarian
divisions and gave birth to an unrelenting Sunni insurgency against the
heavy-handed and discriminatory policies of the Shi’a-led Iraqi government.
Similarly, the war on terror era political commentators also
“generously” accept the fact that the Cold War-era policy of nurturing al-Qaeda
and myriads of Afghan so-called “freedom fighters” against the erstwhile Soviet
Union was a mistake, because all those fait accompli have no bearing on their
present policy.
The mainstream media’s spin-doctors conveniently forget,
however, that the creation of the Islamic State and myriads of other Sunni Arab
jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq has as much to do with the unilateral
invasion of Iraq back in 2003 under the Republican Bush administration as it
has been the legacy of the Democratic Obama administration that funded, armed,
trained and internationally legitimized the Sunni militants against the
Shi’a-led Syrian government since 2011-onward in the wake of the Arab Spring
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa region.
In fact, the proximate cause behind the rise of the Islamic
State, al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and numerous other Sunni
Arab jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq has been the Obama administration’s
policy of intervention through proxies in Syria.
The border between Syria and Iraq is highly porous and
poorly guarded. The Obama administration’s policy of nurturing militants
against the Syrian government was bound to have its blowback in Iraq sooner or
later. Therefore, as soon as the Islamic State consolidated its gains in Syria,
it overran Mosul and Anbar in Iraq in early 2014 from where the US had
withdrawn its troops only a couple of years ago in December 2011.
Apart from Syria and Iraq, two other flashpoints of
Sunni-Shi’a conflict in the Middle East region are Bahrain and Yemen. When
peaceful protests broke out against the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain by the Shi’a
majority population in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, Saudi Arabia
sent thousands of troops across the border to quell the uprising.
Similarly, when the Iran-backed Houthis, which is also an
offshoot of Shi’a Islam, overran Sana’a in September 2014, Saudi Arabia and UAE
mounted another ill-conceived Sunni-led offensive against the Houthi militia in
Yemen in March 2015.
The nature of the conflict in Yemen is sectarian to an
extent that recently the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda’s leader Qasim al-Raymi
claimed that al-Qaeda has been fighting hand in hand with the Saudi-led alliance
against the Iran-backed rebels for the last three years.
The revelation does not come as a surprise, however, because
after all al-Qaeda’s official franchise in Syria, al-Nusra Front, has also been
fighting hand in glove with the so-called “moderate” Syrian opposition against
the Syrian government for the last seven years of the Syrian proxy war.
Furthermore, according to Pakistan’s National Commission for
Human Rights, 509 Shi’a Muslims belonging to the Hazara ethnic group have been
killed in Pakistan’s western city of Quetta since 2013. Although a South
Punjab-based sectarian militant outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi frequently claims
responsibility for the massacre of Hazaras in Quetta, such claims are often
misleading.
The hub of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s power mostly lies in Punjab
while the Balochistan province’s provincial metropolis Quetta, which is almost
three-hour drive from the Af-Pak border at Chaman, is regarded as the center of
Taliban’s activities.
After the American invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in
2001 with the help of the Northern Alliance, the top leadership of the Taliban
has mostly settled in Quetta and its adjoining rural areas and Afghan refugee
camps, hence it is called the Quetta Shura Taliban.
In order to understand the casus belli of the Taliban-Hazara
conflict, it’s worth noting that the leadership of the Hazara ethnic group has
always taken the side of the Tajik and Uzbek-led Northern Alliance against the
Pashtun-led Taliban.
The Taliban has committed several massacres of the Hazara
people in Afghanistan, particularly following the 1997 massacre of 3,000
Taliban prisoners by the Uzbek warlord Abdul Malik Pahlawan in Mazar-i-Sharif,
thousands of Hazaras were massacred by the Taliban in the same city in August
1998 for betraying the Taliban.
The Hazara people are an ethnically Uzbek, Dari (Afghan
Persian)-speaking ethnic group native to the Hazarajat region in central
Afghanistan but roughly 600,000 Hazaras also live in Quetta, Pakistan. Although
the conflict between the Taliban and Hazaras might appear religious and
sectarian, as I have already described the real reasons of the conflict are
political in nature.
Now, when the fire of inter-sectarian strife is burning on
several different fronts in the Middle East and the Sunni and Shi’a communities
are witnessing a merciless slaughter of their brethren in Syria, Iraq, Yemen,
Bahrain and the Af-Pak region, then it would be unfair to look for the causes
of the conflict in theology and medieval history. If the Sunni and Shi’a
Muslims were so thirsty for each other’s blood since the founding of Islam,
then how come they managed to survive as distinct sectarian groups for 1400
years?
Fact of the matter is that in modern times, the phenomena of
Islamic radicalism, jihadism and consequent Sunni-Shi’a conflict are only as
old as the Soviet-Afghan jihad during the 1980s when the Western powers with
the help of their regional allies trained and armed Afghan jihadists to battle
the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
More significantly, however, the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to
1988 between the Sunni and Baathist-led Iraq and the Shi’a-led Iran after the
1979 Khomeini revolution engendered acrimony and hostility between the Sunni
and Shi’a communities of the region for the first time in modern history.
And finally, the conflict has been further exacerbated in
the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 when the Western powers and their
regional client states once again took advantage of the opportunity and
nurtured militants against the Arab nationalist Gaddafi government in Libya and
the Baathist-led Assad administration in Syria.