On February 7, the US B-52 bombers and Apache helicopters
struck a contingent of Syrian government troops and allied forces in Deir
al-Zor that reportedly killed and wounded dozens of Russian military contractors
working for the Russian private security firm, the Wagner group.
In order to understand the reason why the US brazenly
attacked the Russian contractors, we need to keep the backdrop of
seven-year-long Syrian conflict in mind. Washington has failed to topple the
government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
After the Russian intervention in Syria in September 2015,
the momentum of battle has shifted in favor of Syrian government and
Washington’s proxies are on the receiving end in the conflict. Washington’s
policy of nurturing militants against the Syrian government has given birth to
the Islamic State and myriads of jihadist groups that have carried out
audacious terror attacks in Europe during the last couple of years.
Out of necessity, Washington had to make the Kurds the
centerpiece of its policy in Syria. But on January 20, its NATO-ally Turkey
mounted Operation Olive Branch against the Kurds in the northwestern Syrian
canton of Afrin. In order to save its reputation as a global power, Washington
could have confronted Turkey and pressured it to desist from invading Afrin.
But it chose the easier path and vented its frustration on the Syrian
government forces in Deir al-Zor which led to the casualties of scores of
Russian military contractors hired by the Syrian government.
Another reason why Washington struck Russian contractors
working in Syria is that the US-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) – which is mainly comprised of Kurdish YPG militias – have reportedly
handed over the control of some areas west of Euphrates River to Deir al-Zor
Military Council (DMC), which is the Arab-led component of SDF, and have
relocated several battalions of Kurdish YPG militias to Afrin and along Syria’s
northern border with Turkey in order to defend the Kurdish-held areas against
the onslaught of Turkish armed forces and allied Free Syria Army (FSA)
militias.
More significantly, an understanding between the Syrian
government and the Kurdish leadership has recently been reached, according to
which the government will deploy Syrian troops in the northwestern Kurdish
enclave of Afrin in order to augment the defenses of the canton against the
Turkish-led offensive.
One of the main reasons why Washington bombed the pro-government
forces, which included the Russian military contractors, on February 7 in Deir
al-Zor was to preempt the likelihood of such an accord between the US-backed
Kurdish forces and the Russia-backed Syrian government from materializing in
the wake of Turkish-led Operation Olive Branch in Afrin on January 20.
It’s worth noting here that the ethnic and sectarian
conflict in Syria and Iraq is actually a three-way conflict between the Sunni
Arabs, the Shi’a Arabs and the Kurds. Although after the declaration of war
against a faction of Sunni Arab militants, the Islamic State, the US has also
lent its support to the Shi’a-led government in Iraq, the Shi’a Arabs of Iraq
are not the trustworthy allies of Washington because they are under the
influence of Iran.
Therefore, Washington was left with no other choice but to make
the Kurds the centerpiece of its policy in Syria after a group of Sunni Arab
jihadists overstepped their mandate in Syria and overran Mosul and Anbar in
Iraq in early 2014, from where the United States had withdrawn its troops only
a couple of years ago in December 2011.
The so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are nothing
more than Kurdish militias with a token presence of mercenary Arab tribesmen in
order to make them appear more representative and inclusive in outlook.
Regarding the Kurdish factor in the Syrian civil war, it
would be pertinent to mention here that unlike the pro-US Iraqi Kurds led by
the Barzani family, the Syrian PYD/YPG Kurds as well as the Syrian government
have been ideologically aligned because both are socialists and have
traditionally been in the Russian sphere of influence.
Moreover, as I have already described that the Syrian civil
war is a three-way conflict between the Sunni Arab militants, the Shi’a-led
government and the Syrian Kurds, and the net beneficiaries of this conflict
have been the Syrian Kurds who have expanded their areas of control by aligning
themselves first with the Syrian government against the Sunni Arab militants
since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in August 2011 to August 2014, when
the US policy in Syria was “regime change” and the CIA was indiscriminately
training and arming the Sunni Arab militants against the Shi’a-led government
in the border regions of Turkey and Jordan with the help of Washington’s
regional allies: Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, all of which
belong to the Sunni denomination.
In August 2014, however, the US declared a war against one
faction of the Sunni Arab militants, the Islamic State, when the latter overran
Mosul and Anbar in early 2014, and Washington made a volte-face on its previous
“regime change” policy and started conducting air strikes against the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria. Thus, shifting the goalposts in Syria from the
impossible objective of “regime change” to the realizable goal of defeating the
Islamic State.
After that reversal of policy by Washington, the Syrian
Kurds took advantage of the opportunity and struck an alliance with the US
against the Islamic State at Masoud Barzani’s bidding, thus further buttressing
their position against the Sunni Arab militants as well as the Syrian
government.
More to the point, for the first three years of the Syrian
civil war from August 2011 to August 2014, an informal pact existed between the
Syrian government and the Syrian Kurds against the onslaught of the Sunni Arab
militants until the Kurds broke off that arrangement to become the centerpiece
of Washington’s policy in the region.
In accordance with the aforementioned pact, the Syrian
government informally acknowledged Kurdish autonomy; and in return, the Kurdish
militias jointly defended the areas in northeastern Syria, specifically
al-Hasakah, alongside the Syrian government troops against the advancing Sunni
Arab militant groups, particularly the Islamic State.
Finally, in order to understand Washington’s objective that
why it dared to bomb pro-government forces in Deir al-Zor on February 7 that
included private Russian military contractors, bear in mind that it would be a
nightmare scenario for Washington in Syria if its only trust-worthy allies, the
Syrian Kurds, broke off their arrangement with Washington and once again
entered a mutually beneficial alliance with Russia-backed Syrian government – a
scenario which is quite likely after Washington’s NATO-ally Turkey’s repeated
invasions of Kurdish-held areas in Syria, first the invasion of Jarabulus and
Azaz in northern Syria during the Operation Euphrates Shield that lasted from
August 2016 to last March, and now the military intervention in the Kurdish
enclave of Afrin on January 20.
Washington’s primary objective of bombing the pro-government
troops on February 7 that led to dozens of Russian casualties was to create
divisions between the US-backed Kurds and Russia-backed Syrian government.
Clearly, one can’t negotiate and reach a defensive accord with a party whose
backers are bombing you at the same time. But Russia has sagaciously downplayed
the brazen atrocity and moved on with its efforts to reconcile the divergent
interests of competing forces in the Syrian proxy war.