Last week, the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliph, Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, reportedly fled across the border from the town of Rawa in
Iraq to the last bastion of the Islamic State in Syria, the border town of Al-Bukamal.
On Thursday, the Syrian government and allied militias announced victory in Al-Bukamal,
but by late Friday, the Islamic State mounted a counter-offensive and
recaptured the northern neighborhoods of the town.
A question would naturally arise in the minds of curious
observers of the war against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq that why would
al-Baghdadi leave the relatively safer region of Anbar in Iraq for Al-Bukamal
in Syria which is being heavily contested between the Syrian troops and the
Islamic State jihadists? The Syrian troops and allied militias are mercilessly
shelling the town and the counter-offensive of the jihadist group is equally
fierce, with a large number of VBIEDs (vehicle-bound improvised explosive
device) being used against the advancing troops.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from this suicidal
gambit by al-Baghdadi is that the self-styled caliph of the Islamic State has
become tired of living the life of a fugitive on the run and has decided to
fight to death in the last major stronghold of the so-called caliphate that
spanned one-third of Syria and Iraq only a couple of years ago, in order to die
as a martyr and a create a legend around his persona even after his death.
Regarding the composition and command structure of the
Islamic State, although al-Baghdadi has not publicly appointed a successor, but
two of the closest aides who have emerged as his likely successors over the
years are Iyad al-Obeidi, his defense minister, and Ayad al-Jumaili, the in
charge of security. The latter had already reportedly been killed in an
airstrike in April in al-Qaim region on Iraq’s border with Syria. Thus, the
most likely successor of al-Baghdadi would be al-Obaidi. Both al-Jumaili and
al-Obeidi had previously served as security officers in Iraq’s Baathist army
under Saddam Hussein, and al-Obeidi is known to be the de
facto deputy [1] of al-Baghdadi.
More to the point, excluding al-Baghdadi and some of his
hardline Islamist aides, the rest of Islamic State’s top leadership is
comprised of Saddam era military and intelligence officials. Reportedly,
hundreds of ex-Baathists constitute the top and mid-tier command structure of
the Islamic State who plan all the operations and direct its military strategy.
Thus, apart from training and arms that have been provided to the Sunni Arab
militants in the training camps located in the Turkish and Jordanian border
regions adjacent to Syria by the CIA in collaboration with Turkish, Jordanian
and Saudi intelligence agencies, the only other factor which has contributed to
the astounding success of the Islamic State from early 2013 to August 2014 is
that its top cadres are comprised of professional military and intelligence
officers from the Saddam era.
Moreover, it is an indisputable fact that morale and
ideology play an important role in the battle, and well informed readers must
also be aware that the Takfiri brand of most jihadists these days has directly
been inspired by the puritanical Wahhabi-Salafi ideology of Saudi Arabia, but
ideology alone is not sufficient to succeed in the battle. Looking at the
Islamic State’s astounding gains in Syria and Iraq from early 2013 to August 2014,
a question arises that where does its recruits get all the training and
state-of-the-art weapons that are imperative not only for hit-and-run guerrilla
warfare but also for capturing and holding large swathes of territory?
The Syria experts of foreign policy think tanks also appear
to be quite ‘worried’ when the Islamic State overran Mosul that where did the
Islamic State’s jihadists get all the sophisticated weapons and especially
those fancy Toyota pickup trucks mounted with machine guns at the back,
colloquially known as ‘the Technicals’ among the jihadists? According to a
revelatory December 2013 news
report [2] from a newspaper affiliated with the UAE government which
supports the Syrian opposition, it is clearly mentioned that along with AK-47s,
rocket-propelled grenades and other military gear, the Saudi regime also provides
machine gun-mounted Toyota pick-up trucks to every batch of five jihadists who
have completed their training in the training camps located in the border
regions of Jordan.
Once those militants cross over to Daraa and Quneitra in
southern Syria from the Jordan-Syria border, then those Toyota pickup trucks
can easily travel to the Islamic State’s strongholds in Syria and Iraq. Moreover,
it is clearly spelled out in the report that Syrian militants get arms and
training through a secret command center known as the Military Operations
Center (MOC) based in the intelligence headquarters’ building in Amman, Jordan
that has been staffed by high-ranking military officials from 14 countries,
including the US, European nations, Israel and the Gulf Arab States to wage a
covert war against the government in Syria.
Notwithstanding, in order to create a semblance of
objectivity and fairness, the American policymakers and analysts are always
willing to accept the blame for the mistakes of the distant past that have no
bearing on the present, however, any fact that impinges on their present policy
is conveniently brushed aside. In the case of the creation of the Islamic
State, for instance, the US policy analysts are willing to concede that
invading Iraq back in 2003 was a mistake that radicalized the Iraqi society,
exacerbated sectarian divisions and gave birth to an unrelenting Sunni
insurgency against the heavy handed and discriminatory policies of the
Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government.
Similarly, the war on terror era political commentators also
‘generously’ accept the fact that the Cold War era policy of nurturing al-Qaeda
and myriads of Afghan so-called freedom fighters against the erstwhile Soviet
Union was a mistake, because all those fait accompli have no bearing on their
present policy. The corporate media’s spin doctors conveniently forget,
however, that the creation of the Islamic State and myriads of other Sunni Arab
jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq has as much to do with the unilateral
invasion of Iraq back in 2003 under the Bush administration as it has been the
legacy of the Obama administration’s policy of funding, arming, training and
internationally legitimizing the Sunni Arab militants against the
Shi’a-dominated Syrian regime since 2011-onward in the wake of the Arab Spring
uprisings in the Middle East region.
In fact, the proximate cause behind the rise of the Islamic
State, al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and numerous other Sunni
Arab militant groups in Syria and Iraq has been the Obama Administration’s
policy of intervention through proxies in Syria. The border between Syria and
Iraq is highly porous and poorly guarded, and Washington’s policy of nurturing
militants against the Assad regime in Syria was bound to have its blowback in Iraq,
sooner or later. Therefore, as soon as the Islamic State consolidated its gains
in Syria, it overran Mosul and Anbar in Iraq in early 2014, from where the US
had withdrawn its troops only a couple of years ago in December 2011.